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ABSTRACT
Recent statistics show that in 2015 more than 140 millions
new malware samples have been found. Among these, a
large portion is due to ransomware, the class of malware
whose specific goal is to render the victim’s system unus-
able, in particular by encrypting important files, and then
ask the user to pay a ransom to revert the damage. Sev-
eral ransomware include sophisticated packing techniques,
and are hence difficult to statically analyse. We present
EldeRan, a machine learning approach for dynamically ana-
lysing and classifying ransomware. EldeRan monitors a set
of actions performed by applications in their first phases of
installation checking for characteristics signs of ransomware.
Our tests over a dataset of 582 ransomware belonging to 11
families, and with 942 goodware applications, show that El-
deRan achieves an area under the ROC curve of 0.995. Fur-
thermore, EldeRan works without requiring that an entire
ransomware family is available beforehand. These results
suggest that dynamic analysis can support ransomware de-
tection, since ransomware samples exhibit a set of character-
istic features at run-time that are common across families,
and that helps the early detection of new variants. We also
outline some limitations of dynamic analysis for ransomware
and propose possible solutions.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [OPERATING SYSTEMS]: Security and Protec-
tion—Invasive software
General Terms
Security
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent months, numerous Internet users have been victims
of cyber-attack campaigns based on extortion mechanisms
[3], [45]. Ransomware has emerged as one of the most diffi-
cult scareware1 to defend from, as it might be computation-
ally infeasible to revert ransomware’s damage [37]. There are
two basic types of ransomware available in the wild: the first
one, locker-ransomware, is designed to lock the victims’ com-
puter, to prevent them from using it; the second one, and
most common nowadays, is crypto-ransomware, which en-
crypts personal files to make them inaccessible to its victims.
In both cases, users are forced to pay a ransom to regain ac-
cess either to their data (assuming no backup mechanism is
in place) or system. Ransomware has featured prominently
in the media, in particular when in 2014 a Police Depart-
ment’s computer system was infected by Cryptowall [9].
Many victims feel their data are so important that they have
to pay the ransom. For example, when in 2012 Symantec
was able to dismantle a Command and Control (C&C) net-
work used by the CryptoDefense ransomware family, the
follow-on study showed that 2.9% of victims, out of 68,000
unique infections, appeared to have paid the ransom. Ex-
tortion mechanisms, therefore, generate significant revenue
for the attackers. For CryptoWall version 3, statistics ac-
count for an estimated total $325 million in damages in
the US alone [8]. Note that the average ransom request
amounts to $300 [24], and the preferred payment method is
through Bitcoins, due to their untraceable properties. Anti-
virus (AV) vendors strive to keep the pace with sophisticated
malware variants. In fact, signature-based mechanisms are
prone to being easily deceived, especially when new variants
are spread. For example, according to [3], out of the 3,000
unique analysed exploit kits, which are one of the main vec-
tors of ransomware (e.g., around 62% of infections of Angler
exploit kit deliver ransomware), only 6% of their signatures
were found in VirusTotal. Furthermore, the average detec-
tion of these signatures was very low, with usually less than
ten engines (out of around 60) able to detect them. Fur-
thermore, current ransomware implement very sophisticated
packing techniques to evade detection, e.g. obfuscated API
calls [14], rendering the static analysis (e.g., of import ta-
bles) useless. As signature-based AVs are easily evaded, e.g
by the appearance of new variants, it is fundamental to ex-
ploit alternative approaches based on dynamically analysing
behaviours. In particular, machine learning has been widely
applied in research to classify malware, as an alternative to
signature-based approaches [1], [20], [28].
1A class of malware that use tricks to scare users, e.g. by
displaying a warning purportedly from a law enforcement
agency claiming users have downloaded illegal content.
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In this paper, we propose EldeRan, a machine learning ap-
proach to classify ransomware based on their early actions.
The underling assumptions of this work are based on the
observation that ransomware contain unique dynamic fea-
tures and, to stop their spread, it is crucial to detect new
variants during their first appearance. To this end, EldeRan
firstly selects the relevant features that characterize the ran-
somware behaviour, and then classify each newly-installed
application on a user PC through a machine learning algo-
rithm as to perform detection without relying on classical
heuristic or signature-based techniques. The goal of this
work is to understand whether ransomware can be identi-
fied, with a high degree of accuracy, using a limited number
of characteristic features and before infecting victims. Fur-
thermore, EldeRan provides an automatic way for creating
signatures for new variants of ransomware families. EldeRan
complements well AVs signature-based mechanisms, as it
can be used to identify cases where AVs may have missed
new, or unknown, ransomware families. The main contribu-
tions of this paper are:
• We propose EldeRan, a framework to identify the most
significant ransomware dynamic features, and use them
to detect ransomware. Through the Mutual Informa-
tion criterion, we have identified the most relevant dy-
namic features amongst a large set of considered ones.
EldeRan exploits a relatively small set of features with-
out reducing the performance of the machine learning
classifier. By following this approach, EldeRan is also
well suited to detect new ransomware families.
• We have evaluated the accuracy of the Regularized Lo-
gistic Regression by comparing it against other ma-
chine learning classifiers, namely the Support Vector
Machine (SVM) and Naive Bayes. We found that the
Logistic Regression outperforms Naive Bayes and it is
competitive with respect to the SVM. Moreover, the
Logistic Regression is easy to train and adapt com-
pared to the SVM. The regularization technique ap-
plied to the Logistic Regression helps the classifier to
generalize better to unseen samples by preventing over-
fitting.
• We compare the classification results with those of
VirusTotal: EldeRan’s average error rate is 2.4% while
that of VirusTotal is 5.6%, and EldeRan achieves a
remarkable 96.3% detection rate. We also tested the
ability of EldeRan to detect new families of ransomware,
obtaining an average detection rate of 93.3%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we give an overview of ransomware. Sect. 3 details our ap-
proach (EldeRan) based on analysing a set of features in
a sandboxed environment to detect variants of ransomware.
In Sect. 4 we analyse the most relevant features exhibited by
the samples of our dataset based on the EldeRan’s feature
selection algorithm. The results of the experimental evalua-
tion is described in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6 we discuss the relevant
findings of our paper, the limitations of dynamic analysis,
and suggestions of improvements. Finally, Sect. 7 discusses
related work, while in Sect. 8 we conclude the paper.
2. RANSOMWARE
Ransomware is any class of malware whose specific goal is to
force users to pay a ransom to be able to regain full access
to their system. As previously recalled, there are two main
classes of ransomware, i.e. the locker ones and the crypto
ones. In the first case, the goal of the ransomware is to lock
the user’s computer, using simple or sophisticated mecha-
nisms, as to make it unable for the user to regain access to
the computer. Then, they typically display a message across
the screen to demand payment. Access is granted again
only if the user pays the ransom. An early example of this
class is WinLock, which requested the ransom payment to
be made through an SMS, whose cost was set to 10$, to get
the unblock code. On the other hand, crypto-ransomware
aims to quietly search for and encrypt users’ files, and then
asks users to pay a ransom to get the decryption keys to
access them again. Very often crypto-ransomware does not
encrypt the whole hard-disk, but searches for specific exten-
sions only, e.g. .doc, .jpg, .pdf, often of files containing
text documents, presentations, images, which usually con-
tain valuable and personal user data – the ones that af-
fect most the users if lost. Usually, symmetric encryption is
chosen, for efficiency reasons, but asymmetric encryption as
well as hybrid mechanisms, e.g. using a symmetric key to
encrypt the files and using a public key to encrypt the sym-
metric keys [19], have also been used. In both cases, ran-
somware makes extensive use of social-engineering tactics to
pressure the victims into paying, for instance by masquerad-
ing themselves as law enforcement authorities, and claiming
to issue fines for users for allegedly found criminal activities
on the computer (e.g. illegal music files). Similarly, the ran-
somware threatens to publish the users’ pictures and other
personal data on the Internet unless a ransom is paid [12].
According to a study by Symantec [36], from 2005 to 2014
there were only 16 discovered families of Ransomware in the
wild, a small number in comparison to the 27 discovered in
2015 alone and the 15 discovered only in Q1 of this year.
Currently, the top ransomware families are Cerber, Locky,
and CryptoWall [16], while just few months ago they also
included TorrentLocker, CTB-Locker and TeslaCrypt (re-
cently dismissed). This trend shows the continuously evolv-
ing nature of ransomware. A timeline of some notable ran-
somware is shown in Fig 1.
Technological advances have made ransomware more pow-
erful. For example, virtual currency is now the de facto
method to pay ransoms for its untraceable properties [26].
Usually, in these cases, a new, and unique, Bitcoin address
is created for each user, so it can be used as a victim ID as
well as to receive payments. Furthermore, anonymous net-
works, such as Tor, are widely used to hide the location of
the attacker’s servers and to store the victim’s private keys.
In this context, CTB-Locker is probably the most advanced
ransomware to-date [22]. Finally, note that to build a ran-
somware a cyber-criminal does not need to have sophisti-
cated knowledge, as online services, such as ransomware-as-
a-service (RaaS), enable everyone to build their own version
easily [40].
2.1 Infection Vectors
To install ransomware on user’s computer, several techniques
are frequently used by cyber-criminals, such as:
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Table 1: Timeline of Representative Ransomware
Name Year Notable Features
PC Cyborg 1989 Spreads using floppy disks
GPCoder 2005-2008 Spreads via emails; encrypts a large set of files
Archiveus 2006 First Ransomware to use RSA encryption
WinLock 2010 Blocks PCs by displaying a ransom message
Reveton 2012 Warning purportedly from a law enforcement agency
DirtyDecrypt Summ. 2013 Encrypts eight different file formats
CryptLocker Sept. 2013 Fetches a public key from the C&C
CryptoWall Nov. 2013 Requires TOR browser to make payments
Android Defender 2013 First Android locker-ransomware
TorDroid 2014 First Android crypto-ransomware
Critroni July 2014 Similar to CryptoWall
TorrentLocker Aug. 2014 Stealthiness: indistinguishable from SSH connections
CTB-Locker Dec. 2014 Uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TOR and Bitcoins
CryptoWall 3.0 Jan. 2015 Uses exclusively TOR for payment
TeslaCrypt Feb. 2015 Adds the option to pay with PayPal My Cash Cards
Hidden Tear Aug. 2015 Open source ransomware released for educational purposes
Chimera Nov. 2015 Threatens to publish users’ personal files
CryptoWall 4.0 Nov. 2015 Encrypts also filenames
Linux.Encoder.1 Nov. 2015 Encrypts Linux’s home and website directories
DMA-Locker Jan. 2016 Comes with a decrypting feature built-in
PadCrypt Febr. 2016 Live Chat Support
Locky Ransomware Febr. 2016 Installed using malicious macro in a Word document
CTB-Locker for WebSites Febr. 2016 Targets Wordpress
KeRanger Mar. 2016 First ransomware for Apple’s Mac computers
Cerber Mar. 2016 Offered as RaaS (& quote in Latin)
Samas Mar. 2016 Pentesting on JBOSS servers
Petya Apr. 2016 Overwrites MBT with its own loader and encrypts MFT
Rokku Apr. 2016 Use of QR code to facilitate payment
Jigsaw Apr. 2016 Press victims into paying ransom
CryptXXX May 2016 Monitors mouse activities and evades sandboxed environment
Mischa May 2016 Installed when PETYA fails to gain administrative privileges
RAA June 2016 Entirely written in Javascript
Satana June 2016 Combines the features of PETYA and MISCHA
Stampado July 2016 Promoted through aggressive advertising campaigns on the Dark web
Fantom Aug. 2016 Uses a rogue Windows update screen
Cerber3 Aug. 2016 Third iteration of the Cerber ransomware
• Phishing or SPAM e-mails: e-mails including a
link [30] (e.g., to Dropbox [45]), or an attachment
(using common words for the filename, such as ’in-
voice’, ’internal’ [8]) to a malware. Sometimes .src
(Microsoft Windows Screensaver) files are disguised as
.pdf with a fake icon, to lure victims into opening it;
in any case, a malware sample is downloaded, and this
malware downloads or drops the ransomware sample.
Similar techniques apply to IRC, p2p networks, etc.
• Exploit kits: rogue advertisements (ADs) are injected
into an advertising network (malvertising), usually by
placing such ADs on reputable websites to enlarge the
potential audience; the rogue AD redirects users to
attacker’s website, which usually exploits a vulnerabil-
ity in the browser, using an exploit kit (e.g., Magni-
tude, Angler, Neutrino, and Nuclear [15]), to enable
the drive-by-download of ransomware (or of malware
downloading a ransomware in a second step). Note
that almost 75% of exploits in Angler are related to
Adobe Flash, whereas 20% are related to Internet Ex-
plorer [3].
• Downloader and Trojan Botnets: downloaders com-
ing from software-hosting websites, whose official goal
is to allow users to download legitimate files, and as
a hidden functionality download malware without the
user noticing it.
• Social engineering tactics: e.g., by deceiving users
into installing a fake AV, by showing results of AV
scans allegedly showing malware on the user’s com-
puter.
• Traffic Distribution Systems (TDS) [11]: simi-
lar to malvertising, cyber-criminals buy redirected web
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traffic to the site hosting the exploit kit as to enable
the drive-by-download of the malware.
For example, in CryptoWall Version 3, the two primary dis-
tribution channels have been phishing e-mails and exploit
kits, where about two-thirds were phishing e-mails [8]. How-
ever, since April 2015, attackers began relying more heavily
on exploit kits for distribution and propagation of Cryp-
toWall, due to their flexibility and power [8]. The Angler
Exploit Kit, the number one crime-kit to distribute Cryp-
toWall, can actually inject its payload directly into the mem-
ory of infected machines and handily exploits a variety of
vulnerabilities, especially in Flash.
2.2 Recovering from Ransomware
The recovery of a system compromised by locker-ransomware
can be usually done, for example, by rebooting the system
in safe-mode, and running an on-demand virus scanner, or
through similar system-restore techniques. On the other
hand, recovering the data from crypto-ransomware is usu-
ally a more challenging task. In fact, unless the user pays
the ransom, and provided cyber-criminals are willing to give
in exchange the key (which is usually the case, as they want
to preserve their “reputation”), in general it is very hard
to recover the encrypted data (i.e., computationally infeasi-
ble). Usually, the private key is either stored on the server,
or it is stored encrypted on the user storage (sometimes on
the header of the encrypted files themselves) with public
key mechanism. Obliviously, in case the encryption mecha-
nism is not implemented correctly, e.g. cyber-criminals de-
sign and develop their own encryption algorithm, or the key
length is too short, or there are flaws in the protocol [34],
it is possible to recover the data. However, note that usu-
ally this is not the case as ransomware, such as TeslaCrypt
2.0 exploits very sophisticated key generation mechanisms
[33]. In some cases, the private keys is stored in clear (i.e.,
not encrypted with a public key) on the victim’s disk, and
they can be recovered. For example, in some GPcoder vari-
ants, the keys are stored in a registry key, and, hence, it
is possible to recover the key. In other cases, files can be
recovered by simply rebooting the machine before the ran-
somware terminates, as sometimes files are zeroed only after
completing the encryption. We have also to consider those
cases where the encryption keys is (by mistake) deleted after
use, and not stored in the attacker’s server [6]. In these case,
the only way users can recover their files is if they restore
them from a backup. Ransomware may also sometime delete
shadows copies containing old copies of files [25]. Note that
some forensics techniques might be able to recover some files
(or retrieve the key) or, similarly, sometimes cyber-criminals
might disclose the private keys, e.g. after regretting their ac-
tions [21]. Alternatively, the law enforcement might be able
to access the database of encrypting keys or, in some other
case, some AV vendors have made available an online repos-
itory of recovered decryption keys, e.g. for CoinVault and
Bitcryptor2, or an online repostory of several decrypters for
free3.
3. EldeRan: CLASSIFICATION
OF RANSOMWARE
2https://noransom.kaspersky.com/
3https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/
In this section we discuss our approach, and motivate the
selection and use of features to detect ransomware.
3.1 System Design
EldeRan is based on the observation that ransomware sam-
ples typically perform some actions that are unique, or sig-
nificant, with respect to those performed by goodware ones.
Therefore, EldeRan is focused on deriving the most impor-
tant features of ransomware in its early phases. Figures 1
and 2 show, respectively, the design of our proposed sys-
tem in the analysis and detection phases. In detail, EldeRan
firstly dynamically analyses in a sandboxed environment (see
Fig. 1) the traces of samples coming from two datasets of
ransomware and goodware. From these datasets, EldeRan
retrieves, and analyses, the following classes of features: (i)
Windows API calls (i.e., the traces of invocations of na-
tive functions and Windows API calls), (ii) Registry Key
Operations (in particular, the read, open, write, and delete
operations), (iii) File System Operations (in particular, the
read, open, write, and delete operations), (iv) the set of
file operations performed per File Extension, (v) Directory
Operations (the set of operations performed on directories,
in particular the enumeration and creation), (vi) Dropped
Files (i.e., the set of files that are dropped by an application
during installation), and (vii) Strings (the strings embedded
in the binary). All the features, but the last ones (Strings)
are collected while dynamically analysing the ransomware.
After this monitoring phase, a feature selection algorithm is
applied to select the most relevant ones. Finally, the ma-
trices containing these features are used in a Regularized
Logistic Regression classifier, which returns “ransomware”
or “goodware” for, respectively, a ransomware or a good ap-
plication. The classifier is also run online on user PCs to
classify new samples, coming from genuine (compromised)
website or from various infection vectors (see Fig 2). Note
that while the training set is analysed offline, and its classifi-
cation is done una tantum on a sandboxed environment and
requires few minutes only, new applications are classified at
run-time through an online classifier, which is very fast and
can be run on user PCs.
3.2 Feature Selection and Classification
The machine learning component of EldeRan consists of two
phases: feature selection and classification. For the first one,
we have used the Mutual Information criterion [7], which
allows us to select the most discriminating features for ran-
somware and goodware from the features gathered in the
sandbox. Then, for the classification (decision) problem,
EldeRan uses a Regularized Logistic Regression classifier.
Feature Selection. Feature selection is a procedure that
enables reducing the number of features to build simpler ma-
chine learning algorithms, by shortening the training (and
prediction) time, and, in many cases, to prevent overfitting.
Even if these techniques are not always used in machine
learning approaches to detect malware [20, 28], in our opin-
ion they are a key element to make the algorithm more ef-
ficient and achieve a better performance, as we will show
in Sect. 5. In EldeRan, for each feature, we consider only
the presence or absence of that particular feature. Hence,
for these binary features, the Mutual Information criterion
is a good method to select the most relevant ones, since it
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Figure 1: Elderan Sandboxed Training and Analysis
Figure 2: Elderan Live Detection
allows us to quantify how much discrimination each feature
adds to the classifier. Considering that X and Y are two dis-
crete random variables with a joint probability mass func-
tion p(x, y) and marginal probability mass functions p(x)
and p(y), the Mutual Information MI(X,Y ) is defined as
the relative entropy between the joint distribution and the
product of the marginal distributions [7]:
MI(X,Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x) p(y)
(1)
Regularized Logistic Regression. Once we have applied
the feature selection, the final step is to build a classifier to
detect ransomware. Since in this case we have a high num-
ber of features, linear classifiers are usually a good choice,
as shown in [20, 32] where different linear classifiers were
proposed to detect malware. In our case, we have resorted
to the Logistic Regression classifier. This method aims to
model the log-posterior probability of the different classes
given the data via linear functions depending on the fea-
tures [13]. Then, the posterior probability of a sample being
classified as ransomware (R = 1) given its feature vector x
can be written as:
p(R = 1|x, w, b) = sgm
(
w⊤x+ b
)
(2)
where w is the vector of weights, b is the bias term, and the
sigmoid function, sgm(t) is given by:
sgm(t) =
1
1 + exp(−t)
(3)
To fit the values of w and b, we minimize a cost function be-
tween the estimated posteriors and the true labels on a set of
training points. Although there are different cost functions
that can be applied, one of the most common is the cross-
entropy, which also uses concepts from Information Theory.
We selected this cost function since it is more sound when
aiming to model the log-posterior probability of the classes
although, in practice, we can expect a similar performance
with other cost functions like the squared error. Therefore,
given a set of N training samples with D features {xi}
N
i=1,
where xi ∈ R
D, and the corresponding labels {yi}
N
i=1, where
yi ∈ {0, 1}, the cross-entropy cost function can be written
as:
C(w, b) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi log p(R = 1|xi, w, b)+
(1− yi) log (1− p(R = 1|xi, w, b))
(4)
The cost function is convex on the weights and the bias,
which means that it has a unique global minimum. Hence,
to search the values of w and b that minimize (4) we can
use gradient descent methods. In our case, given the size of
the dataset, we have opted for a standard gradient descent
approach in batch mode, i.e. computing the gradient for
the whole dataset at each iteration. For bigger datasets, or
to perform online training, stochastic gradient descent or
mini-batch gradient descent may be more appropriate.
One of the main limitations of the Logistic Regression is
that the maximum likelihood estimation of the posterior
p(R = 1|x, w, b) is prone to overfitting. However, several
techniques exist in the literature to prevent this problem.
Although, we can resort to Bayesian models, placing a prior
on w and b [4], a simpler and common alternative that
achieves similar performance to Bayesian models is regu-
larization [13]. Hence, we can prevent overfitting in the Lo-
gistic Regression model by adding a penalty term to the cost
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function (4). In our case, we have used an L2 regularization
term, so that the cost function for the Regularized Logistic
Regression becomes:
C′(w, b) = C(w, b) +
λ
2
D∑
i=1
w
2
i (5)
where λ is the regularization parameter, which is typically
set by cross-validation. Note that in EldeRan we have two
mechanisms to prevent overfitting: the feature selection with
the Mutual Information criterion and the regularization of
the Logistic Regression.
Although more powerful classifiers, like the SVM, could have
been used, in many practical situations the Regularized Lo-
gistic Regression is competitive with SVM and is easier to
train and to adapt when new training samples are added
to the training set. Hence, the parameters can be adapted
online as new samples arrive without the need of training
the classifier from scratch. On the other hand, although
in some practical situations the simplistic approach of the
Naive Bayes classifier achieves a good performance, it re-
lies on the assumption of independence between features,
which we do not consider to be valid for the detection of
ransomware, where we expect to have strong dependencies
between some of the features, e.g. between API and File Op-
erations. In Sect. 5 we will show the experimental compari-
son of the performance the Regularized Logistic Regression
classifier compared to the SVM and Naive Bayes.
4. ANALYSIS OF THE FEATURES
The ransomware samples of our datasets were downloaded
from VirusShare4, a website that maintains a continuously-
updated database of malware for several OSes. Table 5 re-
ports the full list of ransomware families used for our exper-
iments. To analyse the samples we used the Cuckoo Sand-
box5, a well-know tool to automate malware analysis. The
construction of the dataset, and the use of the sandbox, have
been done following the best practices suggested in [29], and
is described in the following. Later, we describe the features
we extracted and processed.
4.1 Dataset and Sandbox
The dataset of ransomware and goodware was retrieved and
analysed at the end of February 2016, and it consists of 582
working samples of ransomware belonging to 11 different
classes and 942 of good applications6. We strived to col-
lect both old ransomware and new ransomware samples, as
well as recent and well-known good applications (see in the
following). The collected ransomware samples are represen-
tative of the most popular versions and variants currently
encountered in the wild (most of them belong to crypto-
ransomware type). We manually clustered each ransomware
into a well-established family name, since there are several
discrepancies among AV vendors’ naming strategy and it is
therefore not easy to extract a common name for each ran-
somware family. For each family, we downloaded all the sam-
ples found on VirusShare but, for the largest classes (having
4http://virusshare.com/
5http://www.cuckoosandbox.org/
6The initial dataset was larger: we considered a ransomware
or a goodware sample to be effective only if the set of dy-
namic features was not empty.
more that 100 samples), we limited the number of samples
by randomly sampling from VirusShare database. We also
downloaded and analysed a dataset of 942 benign applica-
tions (the goodware set): these were selected from the top
list of the most popular software coming from a software
aggregator website7. To ensure that the downloaded good-
ware samples did not contain suspicious components inside
their payload, we only downloaded applications hosted from
the most trustworthy sources only, as indicated by the inter-
nal AV checker and rating system. Finally, we also double-
checked with the results of VirusTotal. This dataset of
goodware applications includes generic utilities for Windows
(e.g., zipper, password managers, etc.), drivers, browsers
(the most popular ones), file utilities (DropBox, file search,
etc.) multimedia tools (music, video, etc.), developers tools
(Eclipse, notepad++, etc.), games, network utilities, paint
tools, databases, emulator and virtual machines monitors,
office tools, etc. We tried to built a realistic dataset that en-
compasses a large variety of common applications installed
on user PCs. We manually checked that both classes did not
contain samples of the other class, i.e. ransomware labelled
as goodware and viceversa.
The system used during execution was a version of Win-
dows XP 32 bit SP2 without additional software installed,
except for Python (which was requested by Cuckoo for its
agent). We used this version of Windows as its weaker se-
curity protections enables EldeRAN to observe more ran-
somware behaviour [18]. When analysing the malware exe-
cution, no other user application was running in the anal-
ysed machine, and the system was not actively used by peo-
ple. The virtual machine (VM) running in the sandboxed
environment with Windows XP had network connectivity.
We also inserted several files, under different directories, to
mimic personal user files, such as images (e.g., jpg, png), Of-
fice documents (e.g., doc, ppt), documents (e.g., pdf, txt),
and others (e.g., zip). Each VM was reverted to the origi-
nal clean/safe state before each new test. We analysed the
samples of ransomware and goodware in the Sandbox for
30 seconds. Although we allowed network connectivity to
the VM, and collected PCAP traces, we focus here on the
analysis of host-based features only.
4.2 Features
To analyse all the dinamically-generated traces efficiently,
we built a feature parser (see “preprocessing & parser” com-
ponent in Fig. 1) that retrieves all these reports (in JSON
format), and creates a set of matrices that can be analysed
by the EldeRAN feature selection and classifier. Before cre-
ating the matrices, the EldeRAN feature parser implements
some preprocessing and basic feature selection. In detail,
in case of API invocations, the feature parser creates a ma-
trix with the API Stats feature, which takes into account
the absence or the presence of a specific call for this feature.
Concerning the registry keys (Reg Keys), for each of the four
analysed operations, and for each sample, the feature parser
creates a matrix by considering whether the operation was
performed on each specific key accessed by the operation.
Concerning the File Operations, the feature parser creates
similar matrices to the ones related to the registry keys by
considering as features the full paths of the filename along
7http://software.informer.com/software/
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with the absence or presence of the specific operation. Anal-
ogously to File Operations, the features parser creates simi-
lar matrices by considering the file operations performed per
File Extension, and by considering the Directory Operations
(enumerate and creation). For theDropped Files feature, the
feature parser considers as feature the type of the dropped
file, i.e. a new feature is added for each new type of dropped
file (such as PE32, DOS batch, JPEG, etc.), coupled with
the absence of presence of each feature for all the samples of
ransomware and goodware. Finally, for the Strings features,
since the set of embedded strings is fairly large, we limited
ourselves to consider as features each imported library and
function, as well as strings related to crypto-functions, and
string related to file extensions, by creating a single matrix
considering the absence or presence of each of these features.
After analysing all the samples of ransomware and good-
ware, the total number of features was 30, 967. We then
further performed experiments to assess which class of fea-
tures is better suited to classify ransomware when isolated.
By considering only the top 400/100 features, according to
the MI criterion, the percentage of features belonging to each
set is shown in Tab. 2.
Table 2: Percentage of the Most Relevant Features
for Each Class
Features Top 400 Top 100
Registry Keys Operations 48.25% 49%
API Stats 24.00% 27%
Strings 8.25% 5%
File Extensions 8.00% 9%
Files Operations 5.25% 6%
Directory Operations 4.00% 2%
Dropped Files Extensions 2.25% 2%
We observe that the Registry Keys and API Stats are the
two most relevant sets, but also the other sets are useful.
Among all these features, several are characteristic of ran-
somware behaviour, and their presence, together with other
features more generally characteristic of malware behaviour,
leads to a very good detection rate (see Sect. 5). In par-
ticular, high activities on files in personal folders and tmp
directories. Ransomware also often implement registry keys
updates to enable persistence across reboot, or access to keys
to retrieve the list of mounted devices (to search for more
files), or to acquire the list of recently opened files, possibly
because believed to contain important information. Further,
ransomware often include links to DLL related to the usage
of Visual Basic, shell extensions, and access to certificates
(related to key creation and management), or strings show-
ing patterns of extension to be searched for. Characteristic
APIs are those allowing a ransomware to terminate, or write
to, other processes (for example, to inject into explorer.exe
and svchost.exe processes). Dropped files include html and
rtf, used to show the ransom note. The usage of evasion
techniques seems to be recurrent, e.g. trying to search for
the Python agent. Finally, important file extensions include
manifest files, pad, and bat.
5. EXPERIMENTS
We present here the experimental evaluation to assess the
accuracy of EldeRan to detect ransomware, by measuring
the performance and the detection rate of the classifier com-
pared to other machine learning techniques and AV vendors.
We used a Naive Bayes (NB) classifier [13] and the linear
SVM [5, 39] as comparison benchmarks to assess the perfor-
mance of the Regularized Logistic Regression classifier used
by EldeRan. We used the Matlab (version 2015b) imple-
mentation for the Naive Bayes and the SVM, whereas for El-
deRAN we developed our own Matlab implementation. We
applied the MI criterion to select the most relevant features
for the three methods. In the experimental evaluation we
also included the information provided by VirusTotal with
the labels from a pool of AV vendors indicating if a sample
is malware or not. To this end, we have aggregated the la-
bels from the pool of AV providers using a majority voting
strategy. Then, we decided that a sample is ransomware if
more than a half of the AV vendors providing a label for
that sample says that it is malware. For the experimental
comparison, we also considered individually the 5 AV ven-
dors with the highest detection rate measured on the whole
dataset. In the cases where an AV vendor did not provide
a label for a given sample, we did not consider that sample
when calculating the FPs and detection rates for that AV
vendor. Note that this induces an experimental advantage
for the AV vendors. Finally, we have also analysed the abil-
ity of EldeRan to detect new families of ransomware, i.e.
families that are not included in the features selection, and
the training process of the classifier.
5.1 Comparison with other Classifiers
For the first experiment we evaluated the performance of the
3 machine learning classifiers (EldeRan, SVM, and NB) with
the number of features selected with the MI criterion. We
explored using between 50 and 1, 500 features to see which
combination performs better. For each value explored, we
created 100 random splits of the whole dataset with 80%
of the samples for training and 20% as test samples. To se-
lect the regularization parameter λ for EldeRan and the cost
parameter C for the SVM, we performed a 5-fold cross vali-
dation using the whole dataset, exploring values for λ and C
in the range [2 ·10−5, 2 ·10−1] with values of the form 2 ·10p,
with −5 ≤ p ≤ −1. For EldeRan we also explored the value
λ = 0, which corresponds to the standard Logistic Regres-
sion, i.e. without regularization. To train the Regularized
Logistic Regression we used a standard gradient descent im-
plementation in batch mode, with a learning rate of 0.8, and
with 4, 000 as the max number of training iterations.
In Fig. 3 we show the performance of EldeRan, the SVM,
and NB in terms of the AUC with the number of features.
We observe that both EldeRan and the SVM outperforms
the NB classifier. This result suggests the importance of con-
sidering the relation across the different features. Note that
NB considers independence between features, whereas the
SVM and the Logistic Regression take into account possi-
ble dependencies across features. We observe that EldeRan
slightly outperforms the SVM in all cases. Although the
difference is not significant, the Regularized Logistic Re-
gression classifier used by EldeRan is simpler than the SVM
and can be easily adapted to be retrained online, i.e. as
we increase our training dataset with new samples, without
training the classifier from scratch. This property is desir-
able from a practical perspective since we can expect hun-
dreds of new ransomware and goodware samples per day.
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100 random splits for EldeRan, the SVM, NB, and
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By looking at Fig. 3, it is also interesting to observe that
the maximum of the performance for the three algorithms is
achieved for 400 features. Thus, adding more features to the
classifiers does not improve the accuracy. This result shows
the importance of feature selection to reduce the complex-
ity of the machine learning algorithms without affecting the
performance (note that the whole number of features in our
dataset is 30, 967). Moreover, this also suggests that MI is
an effective means of identifying the most useful features.
Therefore, for the remaining experiments we used the 400
features with the highest MI for EldeRan, the SVM, and
NB.
5.2 Comparison with VirusTotal
For the second experiment we compared the performance
of EldeRan, the SVM, and NB with VirusTotal. For El-
deRan, the SVM, and NB we selected the top 400 features.
We have computed the test performance for all the methods
averaging the results over 100 independent train/test splits
with 80% of samples for training. In Fig. 4 we show the
average ROC for the test set. We can observe that VirusTo-
tal outperforms the rest of the machine learning algorithms,
though EldeRan comes close to its performance. On the
other hand, EldeRan outperforms both the SVM and NB,
supporting the results of Fig. 3. In Tab. 3 we show a
more detailed comparison of the four methods in terms of
the AUC and test error, false positive, and detection rates.
We observe that in terms of the AUC, VirusTotal slightly
outperforms SVM and EldeRan, which supports the results
in Fig. 4. However, in terms of the test error rate Virus-
Total (with majority voting) is worse than EldeRan and the
SVM. In this sense, whereas EldeRan’s average error rate is
2.4%, that of VirusTotal is 5.6%. We also observe a better
performance of EldeRan with respect to the SVM (with a
4.2% error rate) and NB (8.0% of error). From the results in
Tab. 3 it is interesting to note that in the case of VirusTotal
all the errors are false negatives, since the false positive rate
is zero. This implies that the detection rate of VirusTotal
is sensibly lower compared to the 3 machine learning tech-
niques. EldeRan outperforms the rest of the methods and
achieves a remarkable 96.3% detection rate. Although the
false positive rate is slightly higher than VirusTotal, we con-
sider that a 1.6% of false positives are tolerable for this kind
of analysis, considering the fact that EldeRan is not based
on signatures, and is also able to detect new ransomware
families. The good average ROC for VirusTotal in Fig. 4
contrasts the poor results in terms of the detection rate.
Table 4: Average test results plus/minus one stan-
dard deviation (over 100 train/test splits) for El-
deRan (ELD) compared with the Top-5 AV vendors,
including the test error, false positive (FP), and de-
tection rates
Test Error FP Rate Det. Rate
ELD 0.0238 ± 0.0090 0.0161 ± 0.0088 0.9634 ± 0.0215
AV1 0.0159 ± 0.0060 0.0066 ± 0.0048 0.9689 ± 0.0142
AV2 0.0274 ± 0.0082 0.0196 ± 0.0080 0.9596 ± 0.0162
AV3 0.0165 ± 0.0064 0.0000 ± 0.0000 0.9567 ± 0.0167
AV4 0.0200 ± 0.0066 0.0000 ± 0.0000 0.9469 ± 0.0173
AV5 0.0205 ± 0.0079 0.0000 ± 0.0000 0.9426 ± 0.0266
Finally, given the limitations on the detection rate for the
majority voting scheme with VirusTotal, we compared El-
deRan with the 5 AVs with highest detection rate over the
whole dataset. Then, we averaged the results of these 5 AVs
over the same 100 train/test random splits used in the pre-
vious experiment. The results are shown in Tab. 4. We can
observe that EldeRan outperforms 4 out the top-5 AVs in
terms of the detection rate. Despite EldeRan’s false posi-
tive rate is higher than 4 of the AVs, the test error rate is
competitive to all of them. In Fig. 5 we show in more de-
tail the average detection rate of the top-5 AVs compared
to EldeRan, and we can see that EldeRan places in the sec-
ond position with a slightly lower detection rate compared
to the best AV. As mentioned before, it is important to note
that the experimental comparison is not fair, since machine
learning methods and AV software work in a different way.
In particular, the measured test performance corresponds to
the performance on samples that the machine learning clas-
sifier has not seen yet, whereas possibly, in most cases, the
AV vendors have the corresponding signature analysis for
those test samples, i.e. they have already seen them. More-
over, when an AV does not provide an answer to a specific
piece of software, we are not considering that as an error8.
8Both when a vendor does not provide an answer for a sam-
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Table 3: Average test results plus/minus one standard deviation for EldeRan (ELD), the SVM, NB, and
VirusTotal (VT) over 100 independent train/test splits, including the AUC, test error, false positive (FP),
and detection rates
Method AUC Test Error FP Rate Det. Rate
ELD 0.9949 ± 0.0025 0.0238 ± 0.0090 0.0161 ± 0.0088 0.9634 ± 0.0215
SVM 0.9929 ± 0.0033 0.0421 ± 0.0108 0.0199 ± 0.0107 0.9219 ± 0.0244
NB 0.9696 ± 0.0081 0.0800 ± 0.0118 0.0958 ± 0.0162 0.9453 ± 0.0212
VT 0.9993 ± 0.0008 0.0561 ± 0.0120 0.0000 ± 0.0000 0.8530 ± 0.0301
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
ELDAV1 AV2 AV3 AV4 AV5
Figure 5: Average detection rate (over 100 train/test
splits) of EldeRan compared with the Top-5 AV ven-
dors
5.3 Detection of New Ransomware Families
In the final experiment we want to test the ability of El-
deRan to detect new families of ransomware. The impor-
tance of this analysis lies in the fact that often new families of
ransomware appear, which share many characteristics, and
goals, of previous classes [17]. Therefore, particular in the
first phases, the average detection of these signatures by AV
vendors is very low, exemplified by the CryptoWall 3 vari-
ants [43]. We manually clustered our dataset into 11 classes
using their generally known family name – as the naming
conventions of the AV vendors are not always consistent or
compatible amongst them. We analysed the detection rate
of EldeRan when one specific family of ransomware is not
considered in the training set, so that family is effectively a
new family for the classifier. Then, for each of the 11 ran-
somware families appearing in the dataset, we selected the
features and trained the classifier considering all the good-
ware and ransomware samples in the dataset, except those
corresponding to the ransomware family under analysis. We
considered two cases by selecting the top 100 and 400 fea-
tures according to the MI criterion. For the classifier, we set
regularization parameter λ = 2 ·10−3 . When testing the de-
tection rate for each family, since the samples in the training
set are the same, we do not need to average the results over
several repetitions. Note that, for a given training set, the
Logistic Regression classifier converges always to a unique
ple on VirusTotal, and when the analysis is absent on Virus-
Total. Note that we used the “cached” mode: hence, most
of the goodware samples were not present on VirusTotal.
minimum of the cost function9.
Table 5: Detection rate across different ransomware
families when EldeRan is trained using only the data
from the rest of the ransomware families using the
most relevant 100 and 400 features according to the
Mutual Information criterion
Family # samples
Det. Rate
(400 ft.)
Det. Rate
(100 ft.)
Citroni 50 0.9200 0.9800
CryptLocker 107 0.9065 0.9626
CryptoWall 46 0.7391 0.9130
Kollah 25 0.7600 0.9600
Kovter 64 0.8906 0.8906
Locker 97 0.8557 0.9175
Matsnu 59 0.9153 0.9831
Pgpcoder 4 1.0000 0.7500
Reveton 90 0.9111 0.8889
TeslaCrypt 6 0.8333 1.0000
Trojan-Ransom 34 0.7647 0.9412
Weighted Avg. 582 0.8711 0.9330
The results of the experiment are shown in Tab. 5. We can
observe that, by using only 100 features, the detection rate
is above 90% for 8 of the ransomware families, and above
80% for 10 out of the 11 families. The results are however
worse when considering 400 features with a detection rate
higher than 90% for 5 families, and a detection rate above
80% for 8 families. It is interesting to observe that the aver-
age detection rate (calculated as the weighted average over
the detection rate for each family) is higher (93.3%) when
using only the top 100 features than in the case of using 400
features (87.1%). This contrasts the results shown in Fig. 3,
where for 100 features we get a lower AUC and then, a lower
detection rate is expected (at least if we consider the same
false positive rate in the corresponding ROCs). The reason
of this comes from the difference between the samples in the
training and the test sets: whereas in the experiment shown
in Fig. 3 the samples for both the training and the test sets
come from the same distribution (since the samples from the
different families are mixed in both sets), in the experiment
shown in Tab. 5 the distribution of the ransomware samples
in the test set can be different to the ones in the training
set. This induces certain “overfitting” to the families that
are known to the classifier and limits the detection for new
families of ransomware. However, in this particular case, it
9In practice there can be very small variations due to the
gradient descent algorithm, but they are negligible.
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seems that all the ransomware families share a common set
of features that are captured by the top 100 most relevant
features according to the MI criterion. This reduces the ef-
fect of the “overfitting” due to the different distribution of
the training and test sets. It is important to note that this
“overfitting” is not due to the Regularized Logistic Regres-
sion classifier and the feature selection algorithm per se, but
to the differences between the distributions of the training
and test sets.
6. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the results of EldeRan, the bene-
fits and limitations of dynamic analysis and suggestions for
improvements.
Benefits of Dynamic Analysis. The experimental results
show that it is possible to detect a ransomware from its early
phases of installation, and also when a new family appears.
In fact, EldeRan achieved a detection rate of 96.3%. Note
that we can expect to see more new ransomware families,
especially with the RaaS availability. In our experiments we
have shown that, even if the initial set of features was rather
large (around 31, 000), in the end only 400 have been shown
to be sufficient. One important result that we were able to
provide is that Mutual Information is very effective in deriv-
ing the most important features. In particular, the registry
key and API calls are the two classes with most relevant
features. Finally, EldeRan is competitive with the top AV
vendors in the detection rate. In this respect, note that secu-
rity researchers have discovered ransomware variants sharing
the same packing and delivery technique (essentially, they
come from the same family) but included random variables
in their code, for each target, that help them evading AV
static signature-based detection [35], especially in the first
phases of a new ransomware campaign, when as few as 2 AV
vendors out of 66 may be able to detect a new variant [44].
This example further favours our assumption that a machine
learning approach is particularly suitable for detecting ran-
somware. Despite these very good results, EldeRan would
not be suitable as a replacement for AV software, and is not
intended as such. However, these results indicate that El-
deRan would be an effective and entirely automated tool to
analyse new software and enhance the detection capabilities
of AV software. In particular, it shows that EldeRan can
identify ransomware with a high degree of accuracy, espe-
cially when new families of ransomware are spread on the
wild, and can thus identify candidates for subsequent signa-
ture extraction.
Note that AV companies are relying on automated dynamic
analysis tools to detect new variants of ransomware (and
other malware): they apply heuristics combined with be-
haviour analysis to deduce whether the executable is be-
nign or malware. EldeRan follows a similar approach and,
in addition, it implements machine learning techniques to
improve the process of classification. There are two main
reasons for employing automated dynamic analysis tech-
niques for ransomware: first, in initial stage of triage, the
main goal is the containment, i.e. the detection of the ran-
somware before infection; to this end, we run the infected file
for a very limited time to select the relevant features; sec-
ondly, ransomware use very sophisticated packing (such as
Themida and VMProtect) and obfuscated techniques that
render most of static analysis tools useless. Therefore, dy-
namic analysis is indispensable to dissect ransomware and
understand their main features and functionalities. Note
that some families of ransomware do not drop their payload
before checking certain preliminaries (environment, C&C ),
where in the absence of these the malware won’t perform
the encryption. Hence, early detection before releasing the
payload in crucial for containment.
Limitations of Dynamic Analysis. We are aware that cur-
rently some limitations of EldeRan. A first limitation con-
cerns the analysis, and detection, of those samples of ran-
somware that are silent for some time, or that wait for the
user to do something. In this case, EldeRan does not prop-
erly extract their features. To mitigate this ransomware’s
behaviour, a solution is to inject some real, or script-generated,
user actions into the sandboxed environment. Analogously,
for ransomware that exploits evasion, or anti-sandbox, tech-
niques, e.g. any malware that looks for signs of emulation or
virtualization, and that does not perform any action in case.
Another limitation of our approach is that, in the current
settings, no other applications were running in the analysed
VM, except the ones coming packed with a fresh installation
of Windows. This might not be a limitation per se but, as
in the previous cases, the ransomware might do some checks
as to evade being analysed. Finally, note that the dataset
consists of 582 working samples of ransomware belonging to
11 different classes and 942 samples of good applications:
however, the initial dataset was larger (1,450 ransomware
samples and 1,131 goodware samples). We analysed a ran-
somware (or goodware) only if the set of API calls was not
empty, which means the ransomware could be run properly.
Improvements. In additions to the previously suggested
improvements, we also point out that any dynamic solu-
tion should to take into account these issues: (i) reduce the
time of feature analysis to be as short as possible; (ii) im-
plement more sophisticated detection techniques, e.g. based
on (known) patterns of system calls used to encrypt files;
(iii) be able to distinguish between actions performed by a
legitimated encryption software and a crypto-ransomware.
We believe that, in any case, the dynamic analysis is needed
to improve the detection of ransomware: in fact, current
packers render the static analysis of ransomware very hard.
Note that the goal of this work is twofold: firstly, to dis-
cover whether it is possible with dynamic analysis to derive
some key-characteristics features of ransomware across dif-
ferent families. Secondly, whether it is possible, by using
these features, to classify ransomware using machine learn-
ing techniques by achieving results comparable to those of
top AV vendors. Note that the classifier, once trained, can
be run on user PCs: as we already pointed out, the Reg-
ularized Logistic Regression classifier used by EldeRan can
be easily adapted to be retrained online when new samples
are available, without the need to re-train it from scratch.
7. RELATED WORK
Currently, little related work specifically targets ransomware.
Hence, here we describe both related works on ransomware
and more general malware-oriented papers. The first de-
scription of the development of a crypto-virus prototype
was in 1996 [41], which described the use of asymmetric en-
cryption. [10] report the first analysis of three ransomware
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families, and showed they did not fulfil the basic crypto re-
quirements (e.g., sufficiently long encryption keys) for mass
extortion. [42] present the experimental results of apply-
ing cryptography to carry out extortion-based attacks, by
implementing the payload through Microsoft Cryptographic
API. More recently, a Symantec report [31] shows how ran-
somware has evolved considerably in the last years, both
in terms of features and spreading capabilities. The au-
thors also pinpoint future directions of ransomware evolu-
tion, such as targeting the wearable market (the so called
“ransomwear”). [38] describe, among others, the underground
market of scareware and ransomware, by showing that (pru-
dent) statistics for CryptoLocker account for $3 million rev-
enue in 2013-2014. In [27] the authors propose a new method
to learn and discriminate malware behaviour. Similarly,
in [28] the authors propose a framework to automatically
analyse malware behaviour through ML. In particular, the
framework allows researchers to identify novel classes of mal-
ware having similar behaviour, and to assign labels to the
new discovered classes. In contrast, in EldeRan we have
shown the importance of feature selection to reduce the
complexity of the ML algorithms without affecting the per-
formance. This contrasts with some solutions proposed in
where no feature selection algorithm is proposed [20], [28].
In [17] the authors analyse 15 different ransomware fami-
lies, by showing that the large majority of samples imple-
ment locking or encrypting techniques through na¨ıve tech-
niques. The authors describe simple techniques to detect
and stop ransomware, such as monitoring abnormal file ac-
tivities. This analysis is confirmed by EldeRan results: by
using a limited set features we were able to detect more than
96% of ransomware. HelDroid [2] is a system for recognizing
Android ransomware using their typical characteristic, such
as functions to lock screen. The detection results for Hel-
Droid are better than those of EldeRan, due to the fact that
the sophistication, and variance, of ransomware for Android
is quite limited with respect to that for Windows. Finally,
[23] is a early-warning detection system for ransomware that
checks for file activities and alerts the user in case of sus-
picious activities, using an union of three features (file type
changes, similarity measurement and entropy).
8. CONCLUSION
Given the monetary gains achievable, ransomware has be-
come the focus of many cyber-criminals leading to its rapid
evolution, and to sophisticated samples able to evade signature-
based AVs. Coping with both new variants of known fam-
ilies, and new families, is therefore of essence. We have
shown that ML is a viable and effective approach to de-
tect new variants and families of ransomware for subsequent
analysis and signature extraction, and as a complement for
AV. Mutual Information has shown to be an effective way of
automatically selecting the features, while Regularized Lo-
gistic Regression has shown to be an accurate algorithm,
easy to train and update, and fast. In terms of results, it
compares well with more sophisticated algorithms and leads
to much better results than more na¨ıve approaches.
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